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Introduction Characteristics of the airlines industry
Characteristics of the airlines industry
• We can not “store” any seat: they are only available at the departure.
Each empty seat is a revenue loss.
• The number of seats in a airplane is fixed.
• The cost of a flight is largely independent of the numbers of occupied
seats.
• People who make their reservations early are more price sensitive: we
can segment market by the time of purchase.
The motivation of Revenue Management
Given that capacity and cost are fixed for each flight, how to increase the
profitability?
Increasing revenue by segmenting market
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Introduction A definition and some numbers
A definition and some numbers
Definition (Smith et al., 1992)
A [. . . ] description of yield management (YM) as it applies to airlines is
the control and the management of reservations inventory in a way that
increases (maximizes, if possible) company profitability, given the flight
schedule and structure.
• American Airlines (AA) estimates the annual revenue contribution of
YM around $500 millions at the beginning of 90’s
• $8.4 billions benefice for the airline industry in 2011 (IATA, 2012)
• Operating margin is on average only 1.64% in US airlines (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2011)
• A medium-sized airline operates 1000 flight legs, 10 booking classes
and its reservation system accepts booking 330 days in advance
(Barnhart et al., 2003).
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Introduction A historical perspective
A historical perspective: the example of AA
1966 Implementation of SABRE (semi-automated business
research environment) a centralized and computerized
reservation system at AA
1977 Introduction of Super Saver discount fare at AA
1978 Airline Deregulation Act in USA that deregulates schedules
and prices. It increases the number and the variety of
discount fares. Besides, airlines began offering connecting
services, using centrally located airports as hubs.
1981 First Low Cost Carriers (PEOPLExpress,. . . )
1985 Introduction of Ultimate Super Saver at AA
1988 Implementation of new Revenue Management System
(RMS) called DINAMO (Dynamic Inventory Optimization
and Maintenance Optimizer) that manages network effects
with virtual nesting.
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Introduction The main components of RM
Main problematics of RM in airlines
Overbooking
No-show rates average 5%-25% of final predeparture bookings. Hence,
overbooking is a trade off between revenue losses of spoiled seats and
costs of denied boarding .
Seat inventory control
SIC is a trade off between revenue losses of excessive number of low-fare
seats and empty seats. Models go from the initial expected marginal seat
revenue (EMSR) to optimal booking limits by Origin-Destination-fare
(ODF) control .
Pricing
There is a natural duality between price and seat allocation decisions
(McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999). Bid-prices can replace multiple booking
limits and complex nesting schemes.
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Dilemma of overbooking
Overbooking is the fact of overselling seats to compensate losses from
cancellations and no-shows. But denied boarding has a cost as well as
spoiled seats.
This Civil Aeronautics Board recognized and controlled this practice.
• Booking are accepted up to 330 days in advance
• Cancellations or new reservations can occur during this period
• Even with a full booked flight, no-shows can lead to empty seats
• Standby may appear at flight time
• It may possible to reassign excess passengers
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Initial model of Beckmann (1958)
A simple model
The model of Beckmann (1958) yields the booking level for reservations
that minimizes expected costs.
a
∫ x−c
0
(x − κ− c)dP(κ | x) + b
∫ x
x−c
N (κ)dP(κ | x) (1)
• The booking level, x , is given
• Model assume a unique fare
• Model does not give any probability of denied boarding.
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Dynamic problem of Rothstein (1971)
• Time is discrete
• Cancellation and booking probabilities are time-dependent
• Cancellation and booking processes have no memory
• Define a denied boarding indicator, d, so the maximum allowed
reservation is r = d + c
Tt
c. . .
n
. . .
r
Figure 2: Markovian decision process described by Rothstein (1971)
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Littlewood (1972): from overbooking to SIC
Overbooking: When prices were regulated, maximizing profit was
equivalent to maximize the number of passengers carried by
flight.
Seat Inventory Control: When prices are unregulated, maximizing profit
leads also to optimize mix of fares.
Single leg Seat Inventory Control
Littlewood (1972) proposed to protect p high-fare seats so that the
probability of denial boarding for high-fare is bounded by Pr(Dhigh ≥ p).
The Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) rule is the following:
flow ≥ fhighPr(Dhigh ≥ p) (2)
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Figure 3: Expected Marginal Seat Revenues for 2-class (Belobaba, 1989)
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Origin-Destination Fare (ODF)
A
B
C
Virtual Nesting
We assume two fares H,L and 2
itineraries AB,AC
Virtual Class
Leg AB
Itina. Fare
Y1 AB H
Y2
AB L
AC H
Y3 AC L
Table 1: Virtual class for the leg AB
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A leg-based seat inventory control system can not discriminate between
AB and AC booking on the AB leg: it does not consider itinerary.
Optimal seat allocation with ODF (Curry, 1990)
Curry (1990) proposed the following program to maximize the expected
revenue for all itineraries j .
max
A
∑
j
∑
k
Rjk(Ajk) (3)
subject to ∑
j
∑
k∈i
Ajk ≤ Ci (4)
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We accept a fare only when R
exceeds the opportunity cost of the
reduction in leg capacities.
ujt(Rj ,Xj) =

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Xj ≤ Ct
0 otherwise
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Average price and demand
Figure 4: Comparison between the daily average price and the estimated price on
CIA–STN route.
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Fares according to booking days
Figure 5: Prices on the Rome Ciampino–London Stansted route for two specific
dates.
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